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PROTECTING COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF THE
UNIONIZED WORKER: DEMYSTIFYING SECTION 301
PREEMPTION
Phillip J. Closius*
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers are frequently subject to employee lawsuits alleging a
tort. Non-unionized employees may seek damages for such conduct
by their employers in state court.1 Unionized employees, however,
face the risk that employers will seek to transfer the case to a federal
district court in an attempt to immunize tort liability by claiming the
complaint is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (LMRA).2 Although § 301 remains essentially
unchanged from the date of its adoption, judicial confusion over the
scope of its preemptive effect frequently has broadened an
employer’s ability to defeat state tort claims by its employees in the
early stages of litigation with a motion to dismiss.3 As a result of this
evolution and accompanying confusion, the common law rights of
unionized workers have been unfairly circumscribed simply because
their union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with their
employer.4 Neither the statute’s framers nor the Supreme Court
opinions which delineated § 301’s impact intended such an expansive
result in favor of management. A proper understanding of § 301 and
its preemptive effect produces a judicial test which protects the
*

1.
2.
3.

4.

Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. A.B. University of Notre
Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975). The author wishes to express his appreciation
to Merritt Pridgeon, University of Toledo College of Law (2001), and William
Sinclair, University of Virginia Law School (2002), for reviewing early drafts of this
Article and Jacob Deaven, University of Baltimore School of Law (2016), for
assistance with research.
29 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2012).
Some scholars have referred to a “presumption in favor of preemption.” Robert M.
Sagerian, A Penalty Flag for Preemption: The NFL Concussion Litigation, Tortious
Fraud, and the Steel Curtain Defense of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 229, 255 (2013).
See Regina Goshorn, Section 301, Tortious Interference and the Sixth Circuit:
Immunization for the Tortfeasor, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 253, 277 (2005).
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common law rights of unionized workers while still ensuring that
collectively bargained agreements will be enforced uniformly
throughout the country.
A series of federal statutes regulate labor law in detail. The genesis
of this legislation is found in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
New Deal.5 Prior to the involvement of Congress in the field,
common law courts were often hostile to union activity.6 The
Supreme Court found unions to be illegal combinations in restraint of
the labor market and therefore, violative of the Sherman Act.7 Union
members were also personally liable for any damages caused by their
union.8 Harsh working conditions, the economic impact of the Great
Depression, and the states’ failure to regulate effectively multi-state
business entities all contributed to a pro-union political majority in
the 1930s.9 The statutes passed during that era—the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932,10 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(often referred to as the “Wagner Act”),11 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 193812—form the basis of modern American labor
law. The other two bedrock statutes of labor law are the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (often referred to as the “TaftHartley Act”)13 and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (often referred to as the “Landrum-Griffin Act”).14 The
political will which produced this statutory framework came from a
desire to protect unions and the collective bargaining process, as well
as stabilize employee access to a unionized workplace.15

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983).
For use of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy as an anti-union legal doctrine, see
Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor and the AntiUnion Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 577–86 (2012).
See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 283, 297 (1908).
Id. at 306, 308–09.
See Levin, supra note 6, at 588–90, 597–601.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
101–115 (2012)).
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012)).
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).
See 29 U.S.C. § 141.
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Congress intended that labor relations generally be governed by
federal law.16 In order to effectuate this goal, federal courts were
given explicit jurisdiction over lawsuits involving disputes regarding
the meaning of collective bargaining agreements. Section 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 states:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.17
This statutory provision therefore expressly permits plaintiffs to file a
contract claim in federal court and defendants to remove a contract
claim originally filed in state court to federal court.
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 301 to be more than simply a
The Court has held that the
statute granting jurisdiction.18
substantive meaning of § 301 directs federal courts to create a body
of national law for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements and the promise to arbitrate grievances found therein.19
Therefore, the Court also has held that § 301 preempts any state
lawsuit alleging a contractual breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. However, in order to protect exclusive federal control
over the meaning of such collective agreements, the Court also has
held that state tort lawsuits, which were in fact contract claims, must
also be preempted.20 This expanded preemptive effect of § 301 has
led to confusion as judges have struggled to distinguish “real” tort
claims from “disguised” tort claims that are actually contract claims

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

See id.
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136,
156–57 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012)). Section 301(b)
provides, among other things, that a labor union may sue or be sued as an entity in
federal court and that any money judgments against a union shall by enforceable
only against the union as an entity and its assets, not the assets of its individual
members. Id. at § 301(b).
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957).
Id.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
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for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.21 The lack of clarity
has been exacerbated by the failure of some judges to distinguish
between the substantive attributes of § 301 labor law and the
requirements for preempting state law.22 Some courts have avoided a
detailed preemptive analysis by citing the importance of arbitration in
labor law and simply expanding the preemptive scope of § 301.23
This judicial trend has unfairly limited the common law rights of
unionized workers and has extended the reach of § 301 into disputes
that were never intended to be federalized.
This Article asserts that the Supreme Court has delineated the
preemptive effect of § 301 with more clarity than many lower courts
realize. Part II of this Article examines Supreme Court cases and
preemptive principles contained therein. Part III analyzes the
accepted principles that have arisen from application of those
Supreme Court opinions by lower courts. Part IV discusses the main
areas of confusion that still exist as lower courts seek to define § 301
preemption. Part IV also offers proposals to distinguish more clearly
state tort claims which are truly based on traditional common law
principles from tort claims that are actually disagreements over terms
of a collective bargaining agreement.
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES
The Supreme Court first dealt with the meaning of § 301 in the
seminal case of Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama.24 In that case, the union and the company executed a
collective bargaining agreement which provided that there would be
no strikes or work stoppages in exchange for a grievance procedure
that involved good faith negotiation and, if that failed, arbitration.25
The union filed grievances regarding workloads and work
assignments.26 When negotiations failed, the union requested the
agreed upon arbitration, and the employer refused.27 The union then
filed a lawsuit in federal court to compel arbitration.28 The Court
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 1991) (Phillips,
J., dissenting).
See infra notes 216–20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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held that “§ 301(a) is more than jurisdictional—that it authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that
federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances
under collective bargaining agreements.”29 The opinion further noted
that the law to be applied was “federal law, which the courts must
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”30 Since the union
had given up the right to strike in exchange for the arbitration clause,
the national policy favoring labor peace dictated that either side of
the collective bargaining agreement have access to the full powers of
the federal courts to enforce the clear terms of the contract.31 The
result in favor of the union was consistent with the dictates of federal
labor policy as revealed in the legislative history of § 301.32
Therefore, while Lincoln Mills did not deal directly with the issue of
the preemption of state law, the opinion is noteworthy for its holding
that substantive federal common law would govern lawsuits for
which § 301 provided federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reiterated the principles of Lincoln Mills in its
next major § 301 decision, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.33 The
applicable collective bargaining agreement provided that the
employer could discharge any worker if his work was not
satisfactory.34 The agreement also contained a binding arbitration
clause for resolving any differences in the true interpretation of the
contract.35 Lucas Flour discharged an employee for unsatisfactory
work.36 In response, the union went on strike for eight days.37 After
the strike ended, the issue was submitted to arbitration as prescribed
in the agreement, and the arbitration panel eventually held that the
employee was validly fired.38 Lucas Flour thereafter filed a state
lawsuit against the union seeking monetary damages for business

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 453–56.
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
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losses caused by the strike.39 The state court awarded damages
against the union in the amount of $6,501.60.40
The Court upheld the damage award against the union, but only
because the strike was a breach of the agreement under federal, not
state law.41 Section 301 depended upon a substantive federal labor
law in order to provide interpretive uniformity of all collective
bargaining agreements:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under state and federal law would
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.
Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it
had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by
the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in
such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or
more systems of law which might someday be invoked in
enforcing the contract.42
The holdings in Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour—that § 301 implied a
preemptive, substantive federal labor law—was not controversial in
the fact patterns of those cases. Such a result was necessary to
effectuate the recognized national labor policy of encouraging the
peaceful resolution of management-labor disagreements through
collective bargaining. State law was preempted only in the context of
lawsuits between an employer and a union to enforce explicit
provisions of a relevant collective bargaining agreement. Therefore,
the two cases that created § 301 preemption applied it narrowly.
The Court next dealt with the issue twenty-three years later in AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck.43 The fact pattern at issue provided the
basis for expanding the scope of § 301 preemption beyond the
holdings of Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour. Lueck was not a dispute
between an employer and a union; rather, an employee filed the
complaint alleging a tort against his employer.44 The collective
bargaining agreement at issue detailed a disability plan which
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103.
471 U.S. 202 (1985).
Id. at 206.
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provided benefits for non-occupational injuries to employees.45 The
agreement also contained a grievance procedure which culminated in
binding arbitration.46 After suffering a non-occupational back injury,
Lueck filed a claim under the disability plan and won an award
pursuant to it.47 Lueck later believed that Allis-Chalmers was trying
to avoid paying the award in full by not making payments, delaying
payments, or insisting that he see various doctors to reconfirm the
extent of his injury.48 However, instead of filing a second grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement, he filed a lawsuit in
Wisconsin state court alleging that Allis-Chalmers had processed his
claim in bad faith, a tort under state law.49 The issue, therefore, was
whether § 301 preempted Lueck’s state-law claim.50
The Supreme Court began its analysis by citing Lucas Flour for the
principle that “[a] state rule that purports to define the meaning or
scope of a term in a contract suit therefore is pre-empted by federal
labor law.”51 The opinion then significantly expanded the reach of §
301 by noting that, in order to effectuate the national policies at stake,
certain state tort lawsuits would be preempted in addition to those
alleging breaches of contract:
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability
that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by
reference to federal law also require that the meaning given
a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal
interpretation. Thus, questions relating to what the parties
to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences
were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement,
must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law,
whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for
breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.52
However, the Court was equally clear that not all tort suits were
proscribed by § 301:

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 214.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206–08.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
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Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in adopting §
301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private
agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent
state regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to
unions and unionized employers the power to exempt
themselves from whatever state labor standards they
disfavored. Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for
what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive
effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would
be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section
to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish
rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.53
The Court specifically noted in a footnote that preemption was not
appropriate simply because a state tort lawsuit contained a claim that
was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.54 The opinion then
stated the appropriate test for determining the extent of § 301
preemption:
Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin
tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied
here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or
employees independent of any right established by contract,
or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of
the labor contract. If the state tort law purports to define the
meaning of the contract relationship, that law is preempted.55
The Court concluded that Lueck’s claim was preempted pursuant to
this test. The key to the state claim was the interpretation of the
phrase “good faith.”56 That concept was not independently defined
by state law, but was necessarily related to the duty or obligation
imposed on Allis-Chalmers by the terms and conditions of the
contract.57 The Court stated, “Because the right asserted not only
derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation
of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 211–12 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 212 n.7.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 217.
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involve contract interpretation.”58 Since Lueck’s claim could have
been pled as a contract claim, his lawsuit was properly preempted.
The opinion further noted that an additional reason for preempting
Lueck’s state-law tort claim was the national policy of encouraging
arbitration.59
The Court stated, “The need to preserve the
effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that
underlay the Court’s holding in Lucas Flour.”60
The Court concluded by emphasizing the narrow focus of its
holding: “Nor do we hold that every state-law suit asserting a right
that relates in some way to a provision in a collective-bargaining
agreement, or more generally to the parties to such an agreement,
necessarily is pre-empted by § 301.”61 The inquiry must necessarily
proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Since Lueck’s claim was
“substantially dependent” upon an analysis of a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement, the lawsuit must be treated as a
labor claim under § 301 (and consequently dismissed for failure to
use the grievance procedure) or dismissed as preempted by federal
labor-contract law pursuant to § 301.62
The Supreme Court expanded its understanding of § 301
preemption in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Hechler.63 Hechler was a union member and electrical apprentice
employed by Florida Power and Light Company.64 She was injured
when she came into contact with highly energized equipment at her
workplace.65 Hechler sued her union for damages related to her
injuries, alleging the union had assumed a duty to ensure that she was
provided with a safe workplace.66 After the union removed the case
to federal court, Hechler conceded that the union’s duty was created
solely by its collective bargaining agreement negotiated with Florida
Power.67 In spite of that admission, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
District Court’s holding that the lawsuit was preempted by § 301.68
The Court of Appeals ruled that, even if the duty was created by the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id.
481 U.S. 851 (1987).
Id. at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 854.
Id.
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collective bargaining agreement, the union’s liability would be
assessed on traditional state negligence principles.69
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit by holding that
Hechler had effectively alleged a “tortious breach-of-contract claim”
that was preempted by § 301.70 The Court had earlier noted that
“[t]he ordinary § 301 case is a contract claim in which a party to the
collective-bargaining agreement expressly asserts that a provision of
the agreement has been violated.”71 Although the parties in the case
at bar were not an employer and a union, the same reasoning applied
to a lawsuit by a worker against her union when the collective
bargaining agreement created the duty:
In order to determine the Union’s tort liability, however, a
court would have to ascertain, first, whether the collectivebargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care
on the Union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe
workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty,
that is, whether, and to what extent, the Union’s duty
extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by
respondent in her complaint. Thus, in this case, as in AllisChalmers, it is clear that “questions of contract
interpretation . . . underlie any finding of tort liability.”72
The Supreme Court earlier noted that the resolution of § 301
preemption would be different if Hechler’s lawsuit was against
Florida Power: “Under the common law, however, it is the employer,
not a labor union, that owes employees a duty to exercise reasonable
care in providing a safe workplace.”73 The common law tort would
impose a duty on an employer, which would be independent of a
collective bargaining agreement.74 Since the union had no equivalent
common law responsibility, its duty could originate only from the
agreement.75 Hechler’s tort lawsuit was therefore dependent on
contract interpretation.76

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 855.
Id. at 861, 865.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 862 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218 (1985)).
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. at 862.
Id.
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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams77 emphasized that a plaintiff’s
complaint alone must be the basis for evaluating a § 301 preemption
claim. In Williams, several employees began their employment with
Caterpillar as union workers subject to a collective bargaining
agreement.78 Eventually, they each were promoted to managerial or
weekly salaried employees, which were non-unionized positions
outside the scope of the agreement.79 According to these employees,
Caterpillar’s management consistently assured them that, if the plant
ever closed, they would have jobs in other Caterpillar facilities.80
These employees were later returned to their hourly unionized
positions, subject to the collective bargaining agreement.81
Caterpillar eventually closed the plant and laid off this group of
employees.82 The former employees then filed a lawsuit in state
court alleging breach of their employment promises and the contract
that resulted therefrom.83 Caterpillar removed the case to federal
court and asserted § 301 preemption.84
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the
lawsuit was not preempted by § 301.85 The Court began its analysis
by stating that prior cases had established a two-part test for § 301
preemption: “Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights
created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims
‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement.’”86 However, the test must focus on the allegations
contained in a plaintiff’s complaint, not on a defense mounted by an
employer:
Caterpillar impermissibly attempts to create the
prerequisites to removal by ignoring the set of facts (i.e., the
individual employment contracts) presented by respondents,
along with their legal characterization of those facts, and
arguing that there are different facts respondents might have
alleged that would have constituted a federal claim. In sum,
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

482 U.S. 386 (1987).
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 394 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3
(1987)).
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Caterpillar does not seek to point out that the contract relied
upon by respondents is in fact a collective agreement; rather
it attempts to justify removal on the basis of facts not
alleged in the complaint.87
The Court emphasized the importance of the complaint as the
touchstone for § 301 preemption in its conclusion:
But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301
question, in a defensive argument does not overcome the
paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint
rule – that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a
federal question must appear on the face of the complaint,
and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.
When a plaintiff invokes a right created by a collectivebargaining agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead what
we have held must be regarded as a federal claim, and
removal is at the defendant’s option. But a defendant
cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action
that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the
action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting
the forum in which the claim shall be litigated. If a
defendant could do so, the plaintiff would be master of
nothing. 88
Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of an oral contract were not created by,
or dependent on, the collective bargaining agreement. The existence
of provisions in the bargaining agreement which dealt with
termination of employees and Caterpillar’s duty to reassign laid off
workers were not determinative of § 301 preemption since the
complaint was not based on, nor made reference to, such
provisions.89 The existence of the oral contracts and their breach
were therefore properly resolved by state, not federal, law.
The Supreme Court clarified the relationship between § 301
preemption and the existence of a grievance process in its next
decision, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.90 In analyzing
Lingle, it is important to note that the Lueck opinion stated that the
holding in Lucas Flour was based in significant part on preserving
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 396–97 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 398–99 (emphases omitted) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 394–95.
486 U.S. 399 (1988).
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the effectiveness of arbitration.91 Lingle was injured on the job and
requested compensation for her medical expenses from Norge
consistent with Illinois workers’ compensation law.92
Norge
thereafter discharged her for filing a “false” workers’ compensation
claim.93 The applicable collective bargaining agreement contained
provisions protecting unionized workers from discharge except for
“proper” or “just” cause.94 Lingle’s union promptly filed a grievance
on her behalf pursuant to the process detailed in the agreement.95 An
arbitrator eventually ruled in Lingle’s favor, and she received
reinstatement with full back pay.96 After the grievance was filed,
Lingle also filed a lawsuit in state court alleging that Norge had fired
her in retaliation for exercising her rights under Illinois law.97 Norge
removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss based on §
301 preemption.98 The District Court granted Norge’s motion and
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Lingle’s complaint.99
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that
Lingle’s state lawsuit was not preempted by § 301 despite the
concurrent grievance filing.100 The Court noted that the facts of
retaliatory discharge did not involve the interpretation of a provision
in the collective bargaining agreement, but instead focused on “the
conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the
employer.”101 Accordingly, “the state-law remedy in this case is
‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of
‘independent’ that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution
of the state-law claim does not require construing the collectivebargaining agreement.”102
The Court of Appeals decided to preempt because the state court
would be resolving the same facts and deciding the same issue as the
arbitrator—whether there was just cause to fire Lingle. The Court
expressly rejected that analytical similarity as the basis for § 301
preemption:
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 407.
Id.
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[Section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law
will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining
agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a
State may provide to workers when adjudication of those
rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such
agreements. In other words, even if dispute resolution
pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one
hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is “independent” of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes.103
The Supreme Court therefore held that the existence of a grievance or
arbitration process in an applicable collective bargaining agreement
was not relevant in a § 301 preemption analysis. While preserving
the efficacy of arbitration factored into the development of federal
common law under § 301, preemption under that statutory provision
focused on the need to interpret a term of the collective bargaining
agreement in order to resolve the complaint.
The case United Steelworkers v. Rawson104 presented the Court
with a state tort claim brought by the survivors of four employees
against their union. The workers were miners who were killed in an
underground fire that occurred at the Sunshine Mine in Kellogg,
Idaho.105 The “complaint alleged that the miners’ deaths were caused
by [the] fraudulent and negligent acts” of the union.106 The
applicable collective bargaining agreement had established a joint
management-labor safety committee to make the mines safer for
workers.107 Plaintiffs alleged that the union had inadequately
prepared its investigators and, as a result, negligently performed
inspections that failed to detect obvious flaws in the mines.108 The
Court cited Hechler in holding that the basis of the state tort alleged
in the complaint—the union’s duty to inspect the mines—was created
and defined by the collective bargaining agreement.109 Since the
union did not have a common law duty to provide a safe workplace,
the complaint could not allege that the union violated the independent
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 409–10 (footnote omitted).
495 U.S. 362 (1990).
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 370.
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duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society.110
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ complaint was preempted under § 301.111
The most recent Supreme Court case of significance regarding §
301 preemption is Livadas v. Bradshaw.112 Livadas was a grocery
store clerk at Safeway until her discharge.113 Her collective
bargaining agreement explicitly provided that all disputes relating to
unjust discharge would be subject to binding arbitration.114
California state law required that all discharged workers be paid the
wages owed to them immediately.115 When Lividas was fired on
January 2, 1990, she demanded her wages immediately.116 Her
manager refused to pay her, stating that company policy was to mail
her a check from a central location.117 She received the check on
January 5, 1990 for all wages due to her through January 2, 1990.118
She then filed a claim against Safeway with the California Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement, demanding three days’ wages to
compensate for the delay.119 The Commissioner refused her claim,
relying on a policy that statutory wage claims were not available to
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.120 Livadas
filed a lawsuit in federal District Court to enforce payment of her
claim.121
The Commissioner argued that § 301 preempted her from paying
Livadas on her claim since the determination of the amount she
would be owed would depend on the collective bargaining
agreement, and federal labor policy favored arbitration to resolve
these types of grievances.122 The Supreme Court disagreed and held
that § 301 did not preempt Livadas’ claim:

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 371. The Court cited Hechler, again noting that the situation would be
different if the lawsuit had been brought against an employer who possesses a
common law duty to provide a safe workplace. Id. at 374.
Id. at 372. The Court also held that, pursuant to § 301 federal common law, mere
negligence was not enough for the union to violate its duty of fair representation to
its members. Id. at 372–73.
512 U.S. 107 (1994).
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 121.
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In Lueck and in Lingle . . . we underscored the point that §
301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights
conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law,
and we stressed that it is the legal character of a claim, as
“independent” of rights under the collective-bargaining
agreement . . . that decides whether a state cause of action
may go forward. Finally, we were clear that when the
meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the
bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does
not require the claim to be extinguished.123
The only issue in the case—whether Safeway willfully failed to pay
Livadas’ wages promptly on severance—was strictly a question of
state law independent of the bargaining agreement.124 Preemption
was not supported because the collective bargaining agreement
needed to be referenced in order to determine Livadas’ wage and
therefore her damages.125 The opinion concluded by noting that §
301 and other federal labor laws should not be interpreted to deny
union workers state-law rights granted to all non-union workers,
especially in the absence of clear and explicit language waiving the
right if state law permits such a waiver.126
Williams, Lingle, and Livadas all held that the employee’s claims
were not preempted. These three opinions reflect the Supreme
Court’s belief that many of the lower courts had been reading § 301
preemption too broadly. After those decisions, a number of circuits
revisited their preemption decisions and revised them to conform to
Supreme Court precedent.127
III. PREEMPTION CLARITY
Although the Supreme Court cases appear to establish clear rules
for the interpretation of § 301 preemption, lower federal courts
occasionally have struggled to apply them to a wider range of fact
patterns.
The Ninth Circuit, in Cramer v. Consolidated
Freightways,128 noted the difficulty of the task in determining the
extent of § 301 preemption:
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 123–24 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 128–33.
See infra Part III.
255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001).
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The demarcation between preempted claims and those that
survive § 301’s reach is not, however, a line that lends itself
to analytical precision.
As the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Livadas, “[T]he Courts of Appeals have
not been entirely uniform in their understanding and
application of the principles set down in Lingle and [AllisChalmers].” And little wonder. “Substantial dependence”
on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the specific facts
of each case, and the distinction between “looking to” a
CBA and “interpreting” it is not always clear or amenable to
a bright-line test.129
Other circuits have noted the difficulties inherent in § 301 inquiry.130
However, the case law has in fact developed a number of accepted
black letter law principles in the preemptive analysis.131
The Supreme Court in Williams noted that preemption was
appropriate when a claim was premised on rights directly created by
a collective bargaining agreement or substantially dependent on an
analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.132 A two-part test has
emerged from the application of this language:
1) Is the right (or corresponding duty) alleged by the
plaintiff only (or solely) created by the applicable collective
bargaining agreement?; and
2) Is any element of the state-law claim alleged by the
plaintiff substantially dependent on the interpretation of a
term or provision contained in the applicable collective
bargaining agreement for its resolution?133
129.
130.
131.

132.
133.

Id. at 691 (citation omitted).
McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 1991); see also
Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and
Section 301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J. 1841, 1854–55 (2014).
The circuit courts of appeals were more willing to preempt state-law claims before
the clarifying Supreme Court decisions of Williams, Lingle, Rawson, and Livadas.
Both the Third and the Ninth Circuits have explicitly overruled earlier cases as being
inconsistent with these later Supreme Court decisions. See Kline v. Sec. Guards,
Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692–93 (9th
Cir. 2001).
See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text.
See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 265 (1996); Williams v. NFL, 582
F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009); Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.
2004); Goshorn, supra note 4, at 264–65; Telis, supra note 130, at 1849. The word
“only” is properly added to the creation of the right or duty because the Supreme
Court held in Lingle that if a right is created by both state law and the collective
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If the answer to both questions is no, then the complaint should not
be preempted. If the answer to either or both questions is yes, then §
301 preemption is appropriate and the matter should be resolved by
substantive federal labor law. Both questions must be resolved solely
by an examination of the plaintiff’s complaint.134 The defendant’s
defensive assertions may not be considered in the resolution of the
preemptive questions.135
The first prong of this test is the easiest to apply. The complaint on
its face or by necessity must allege a right or duty that is only found
in a collective bargaining agreement. This requirement is derived
from the Supreme Court’s opinions in Hechler and Rawson. In both
of those cases, the defendant was a union.136 Because unions were
not recognized at common law as full legal entities and are mainly
creatures of federal statutory law, they historically have not been
subject to common law duties.137 In fact, both opinions noted that the
respective employers, not the unions, had the independent common
law duty of reasonable care to maintain a safe workplace owed to
every member of society.138 The lawsuit, therefore, would not have
been preempted if brought against the employer. However, the
union’s lack of common law duty meant that the right asserted by the
plaintiffs was necessarily created and defined by the collective
bargaining agreement.139 Therefore, preemption was appropriate
since the right and corresponding duty were solely created by
contract, not state common law or statutory law.
In a lawsuit against an employer, preemption under this first test
also applies to any complaint which—explicitly or by necessary
implication—alleges rights that originate only from a collective
bargaining agreement. In Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Group,140 the
Second Circuit stated that preemption was appropriate if a complaint

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

bargaining agreement, then the plaintiff is not limited simply to the agreement and
therefore not preempted. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2007); Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002); Sagerian,
supra note 3, at 252.
Alongi, 386 F.3d at 727; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 397
(1987).
Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Williams,
482 U.S. at 397.
United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 364 (1990); Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 853 (1987).
Rawson, 495 U.S. at 369; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859.
Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859.
Rawson, 495 U.S. at 370; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 862. Hechler had in fact explicitly
conceded that the duty came only from the CBA. Hechler, 481 U.S. at 854.
127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997).
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alleging a state common law “tort premised on the violation of duties
in the CBA.”141 Former employees in Foy, however, alleged that
their employer made intentional or negligent misrepresentations to
them that violated state statutory and common law.142 Foy claimed
that her employer promised that she would be given an opportunity to
transfer to another factory prior to any layoff at her current factory.143
She was laid off without such an opportunity as permitted by the
terms of her collective bargaining agreement.144 The Second Circuit
held that Foy’s complaint was not preempted because she alleged
independent state-law rights and did not reference any collective
bargaining agreement: “State law—not the CBA—is the source of the
rights asserted by plaintiffs: the right to be free of economic harm
caused by misrepresentation.”145 In Cephas v. MVM, Inc.,146 the
District of Columbia Circuit preempted a state-law-based complaint
by an employee against his employer alleging that the employer had
transferred him in violation of its collective bargaining agreement.147
However, Cephas’s lawsuit was properly preempted because
“[n]either his complaint nor his brief, however, identifies any source
of right—such as an individual employment agreement—other than
the CBA.”148 Accordingly, Cephas’s only recourse was a suit
pursuant to the substantive federal labor law contained in § 301.149
The first part of this test is therefore clear in its application. If the
defendant in a common law tort suit brought by an employee is a
union, Hechler and Rawson effectively hold that most common law
claims will be preempted. If the defendant in such a case is an
employer, and the complaint makes no reference to a collective
bargaining agreement but relies solely on state law, the claim will not
be preempted pursuant to this part of the test. A plausible argument
that the right or duty at issue is not exclusively derived from a
collective bargaining agreement (but can be grounded on independent
state grounds) should satisfy this portion of the preemption analysis.
The limited nature of the first part of the § 301 preemption test,
however, means that the second prong is the one more frequently in
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 235.
520 F.3d 480 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 484.
Id. The court also held that such a § 301 action was not precluded by the applicable
statute of limitations and could therefore proceed in the district court. Id. at 490.
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dispute and, therefore, more difficult to apply. Preemption of claims
that are substantially dependent on the interpretation of a term in a
collective bargaining agreement is required to enforce the policy
against enforcement of tort claims that are simply cleverly disguised
contract disputes.150 Interpretive preemption was created by Lueck.
The employee in that case alleged that his employer had violated a
state-law duty to process his disability claim in good faith.151
Accordingly, the right or duty was not created solely by the collective
bargaining agreement but had an independent basis in state law. The
Court therefore could not use the first part of the preemption test as
defined herein. However, the opinion noted that the state law at issue
did not define “good faith”; that determination was a case by case
inquiry of the applicable standards contained within the collective
bargaining agreement.152 Thus, the complaint was preempted
because the definition of the state-law claim necessarily required an
interpretation of “good faith” as detailed in the collective bargaining
agreement.153 The need for uniformity in the meaning of terms in
collective bargaining agreements dictated that terms be defined by
federal, not state, law.154 The agreement provided in detail the
meaning of “good faith” in the processing of disability claims.155
The Lueck result has been the source of confusion as lower courts
struggle with the issue of whether traditional tort concepts such as
“reasonable,” “outrageous,” or “reliance” are as vague as “good
faith,” consequently requiring interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement for their definitions. However, some parts of
the analysis are clear: Lueck holds that not all claims related to the
workplace must be resolved by federal law, and preemption does not
occur simply because the lawsuit arises from a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.156 The circuits have applied this concept to
mean that preemption cannot occur simply because the general
subject of the complaint is covered by a collective bargaining
agreement; defendant must show that the elements of the complaint
are substantially dependent on a specific provision of the
agreement.157 Lueck also explicitly states that a complaint alleging
conduct by a defendant that is illegal under state law may not be
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 212 n.7.
Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Berda v. CBS
Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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preempted.158 The circuits have reinforced this rule by holding that a
collective bargaining agreement could not authorize a violation of
state or federal law even if it purported to do so.159 Therefore, no
term would be subject to interpretation. The illegality exception has
been extended to include claims that assert a public policy violation
of a state.160 Employees—under the reasonable person standard from
tort theory—have a right to assume their employers will obey the law
since illegal behavior is inherently unreasonable.161 Finally, the
Supreme Court in Lingle held that preemption would not be
supported simply because the same facts in the state claim could
possibly support a grievance pursuant to the collective agreement.162
The circuits have therefore held that the existence of a grievance
process in an agreement is irrelevant for preemption purposes.163
The treatment of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the circuit courts of appeals provides a clear illustration of
the preemption rules in application. If an employee alleges that an
employer has committed such a tort, state law requires that the
employee prove the employer’s conduct to be “outrageous.”164
However, the term “outrageous” is not defined by tort law, so it must
be decided on a case-by-case basis. In Douglas v. American
Information Technologies Corp., the Seventh Circuit preempted an
intentional infliction of emotional distress charge because the
complaint only alleged employer activity that was covered by the
applicable collective bargaining agreement.165 The court noted that
the tort did not exist when the employer “has done no more than to
insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is
well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional
distress.”166 Similarly, in Baker v. Farmers Electric Cooperative,
Inc., the Fifth Circuit preempted a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because the plaintiff did not allege any activities
by the employer that were outside of those sanctioned by the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212. The most frequent types of these claims are based on assault
and battery, retaliatory discharge, and age and gender (especially sexual favors)
discrimination. See Goshorn, supra note 4, at 270.
Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 2004).
See Goshorn, supra note 4, at 272–73.
Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695–96 (9th Cir. 2001).
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1243–44 (8th Cir. 1995).
Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 34 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1994); Douglas v. Am.
Info. Techs. Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 570–71 (7th Cir. 1989).
Douglas, 877 F.2d at 572–73.
Id. at 571 (quoting Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976)).
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collective bargaining agreement: “Baker does not allege that any
action on the part of the defendants other than his reassignment to a
maintenance position has caused him mental distress. He alleges no
instances of harassment, discrimination, physical abuse, or other
conduct which would provide grounds for an emotional distress
claim.”167
If the collective bargaining agreement could not possibly sanction
the employer’s activity (e.g., assault and battery or sexual
harassment), the definition of “outrageous” can be determined
without reliance on the agreement, and preemption is not
warranted.168 However, conduct authorized by the bargaining
agreement—such as the reassignment of an employee here—requires
interpretation of the agreement in order to define an element of the
claim. Such conduct cannot be “outrageous” and preemption is
mandated.169
In Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc.,170 the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the analysis of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, but reached a
different result based on the facts before it. Lightning alleged that
Roadway management had spit on him, verbally abused him and tried
to hit him.171 The court affirmed the District Court’s holding that
Lightning’s claim was not preempted:
Contrary to Roadway’s assertions, Lightning’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim does not concern the
terms and conditions of his employment, but rather the
severe abuse he endured from Roadway’s supervisors. . . .
Thus, Lightning’s claim “revolve[s] around conduct by his
employer that is not even arguably sanctioned by the labor
contract.”172
The resolution of the preemption issue thus centered on whether the
plaintiff’s complaint alleged outrageous conduct by the defendant
that was outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.173

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Baker, 34 F.3d at 280.
Id. at 280–81.
Id.
60 F.3d 1551, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1554–55.
Id. at 1557 (alteration in original) (quoting Keehr v. Consol. Freightways of Del.,
Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 138 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Other circuit courts of appeals have accepted this distinction between complaints
which only alleged activity covered by a collective bargaining agreement and those
which allege actions outside of anything contemplated by the agreement. See
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The circuits also agree that non-signatories to the collective
bargaining agreements may not bring § 301 lawsuits and, therefore,
are not able to assert § 301 preemption.174 The lower courts also
have held that § 301 preemption should be granted only when doing
so furthers the purposes behind the Labor-Management Relations Act
as stated in Livadas—preventing state law from deciding what parties
agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement, determining what
legal consequences flow from breaches of the agreement, and
permitting parties to renege on their arbitration promises by
relabeling grievable issues as tort claims.175 Lawsuits involving nonsignatories do not implicate any of the recognized purposes of the
LMRA and § 301 preemption is therefore appropriately irrelevant to
such a dispute.
IV. PREEMPTION CONFUSION
The concepts noted in Part III are easy to comprehend as black
letter law. However, certain repeated misunderstandings in the
application of those principles have produced the judicial confusion
noted in many Courts of Appeals’ opinions. Most of the difficulties
are caused by a court expanding the reach of § 301 preemption
beyond its intended scope. This judicial overreaching manifests itself
in four basic ways:
(1) a lack of clarity regarding what is an element of a claim
and what is a defense; (2) a decision to preempt because a
collective bargaining agreement has terms dealing with the
general subject matter of the complaint, but not the specific
claim alleged; (3) a different interpretation of the concept of
“duty”; and (4) an erroneous perception regarding the role
of a collective bargaining agreement’s grievance process in
the preemptive assessment.
As noted above, the case law is clear that preemption analysis
should be focused solely on the plaintiff’s complaint and not potential
defenses by the defendant.176 However, even this seemingly “bright

174.
175.
176.

Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991); Fox v. Parker
Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 802 (6th Cir. 1990).
See Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1325 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993); UMWA v. Covenant
Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Goshorn, supra note 4, at
271–72.
Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Grp., 127 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122–23 (1994)).
See supra Parts II–III.
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line” test can be difficult to apply as judges disagree on what is
defined as an element of the claim and what is properly characterized
as a defense. This distinction split an en banc panel on the Fourth
Circuit regarding application of § 301 preemption to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress in McCormick v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.177
McCormick alleged that, after he was
terminated, an AT&T supervisor forced open his locker, removed his
personal possessions, and threw them in the trash.178 McCormick’s
complaint alleged that, pursuant to Virginia tort law, such a
disposition constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of the same, conversion, and negligence in the
care of a bailment.179 Both the majority and the dissent agreed that
the critical inquiry involved the location of the defendant’s duty.180
The majority concluded that, under Virginia law, the plaintiff had the
burden of proving that the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct
that was also “outrageous and intolerable.”181 Both elements required
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for a resolution:
If management owed him no duty and was entitled under the
agreement to dispose of the contents of his locker in the
manner it did, its actions ipso facto could not have been
wrongful under state law. . . . If management’s actions in
disposing of the contents of McCormick’s locker were
authorized under the collective bargaining agreement, those
actions could not simultaneously be considered “outrageous
and intolerable” under Virginia law.182
The majority perceived that the plaintiff must establish the
defendant’s duty, and his claims were preempted since interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement was essential to determining
that issue.183
The dissent argued vigorously that applicable Supreme Court
precedent indicated that preemption was appropriate when the
defendant’s duty could be located only in the collective bargaining
agreement.184 The dissent believed the majority reached the wrong
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 531 (4th Cir. 1991) (4-3
decision).
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 542, 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Id. at 535 (majority opinion).
Id. at 537.
See id. at 535–37.
Id. at 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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conclusion by failing to look solely at the plaintiff’s complaint, but
instead considered the entire action—claims and defenses—in
evaluating the propriety of preemption.185 Such methodology was in
direct conflict with repeated Supreme Court holdings that the
complaint alone should be considered in the assessment.186 The
dissent then concluded with addressing what the relevant issue should
be:
[W]hether McCormick’s well-pleaded state-law tort claim
locates the duty allegedly violated by AT & T in their labor
contact [sic] or in some source of legal duty independent of
that contract. The answer to that issue is plain: in an
independent source, Virginia tort law. Specifically, in the
duty imposed by that body of law upon all persons, running
to society in general and not dependent upon any
employment relationships, (1) not to engage in intentional or
reckless conduct (2) that is outrageous and intolerable,
offending generally accepted standards of decency . . . .187
The issue of whether AT&T was authorized to open the locker and
dispose of its contents was a defense that should be resolved properly
at trial, not in a preemption motion.188 Since the tort duty pled in the
complaint could be determined without reference to any collective
bargaining agreement, the dissent concluded that McCormick’s
claims should not be preempted.189
McCormick confused the preemption analysis by incorrectly
focusing on whether the defendant’s conduct was authorized by the
collective bargaining agreement.190 This emphasis is inconsistent
with the accepted rule that a defense cannot support a preemption
decision. The majority should have adopted the analysis of other
circuits that have considered the issue: did the complaint allege
behavior outside of the scope of activities covered by the collective
bargaining agreement?191 If yes, then the defendant’s duty is
independently grounded in state law and preemption is inappropriate;
if no, then the complaint is substantially dependent on the contract
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 545.
See id.
Id. at 547.
See id. at 544.
See cases cited supra notes 163–73 and accompanying text.
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and preemption should be applied. Since the collective bargaining
agreement never mentioned lockers or the employer’s ability to open
them, preemption in McCormick was inappropriate because the
complaint alleged behavior outside the scope of the collective
bargaining agreement.192
The McCormick majority compounded its error by relying on
general provisions of the collective bargaining agreement to justify
opening the locker and disposing of its contents. The actual
collective bargaining agreement contained no authorization for
opening an employee’s locker and no provision for dealing with the
disposition of its contents.193 Instead, the majority relied on a general
management rights provision and the existence of a grievance process
for any mandatory subject of bargaining.194 Precedent clearly has
established that a specific provision in an agreement is needed to
support preemption; it cannot be granted simply because the claim
relates to a mandatory subject of bargaining or the agreement deals
with the general subject matter of the complaint.
This type of error is also illustrated by comparing two cases
regarding concussions in professional football: Duerson v. NFL195
and Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC.196 In Duerson,
the estate of a deceased football player sued the NFL for negligence,
fraudulent concealment, and negligent failure to warn regarding the
organization’s knowledge of the dangers of concussions in
professional football and its failure to inform players of the brain
damage possible from such concussions.197 The district court
preempted all of the plaintiff’s claims by accepting the NFL’s
argument that the state-law tort standard of reasonableness required
interpretation of the terms of the NFL’s collective bargaining
agreements.198 The court then cited multiple provisions dealing with
player health and concluded that those provisions might be
interpreted to impose a general duty on the NFL clubs to provide
health care for players.199 The opinion then stated that the
agreement’s imposition of health care duties on the clubs could
justify a lower standard of reasonableness for the NFL than generally
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 536. For an application of a similar “something extra”
beyond the collective agreement in any intentional tort claim, see Sagerian, supra
note 3, at 267–69.
McCormick, 934 F.2d at 536.
Id.
No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).
21 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id.
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required for state tort law.200 The decision failed to identify a
specific term of the collective bargaining agreement, relying instead
on the agreement’s general inclusion of player health issues. As
noted above, this methodology is inconsistent with preemption
precedent.
In Green, a district court faced a preemption claim similar to
Duerson in the context of a lawsuit against an NFL Club for
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment
in failing to inform players about potential brain injuries from
concussions.201 The defendant argued the same collective bargaining
agreement provisions regarding general player safety that were
accepted by Duerson.202 The Green opinion, however, correctly
rejected the same preemption motion granted by the Duerson
opinion.203 The opinion noted, “[H]ere the duties arise out of the
common law based upon the employer-employee relationship and not
out of any particular terms in the CBAs.”204 The plaintiffs’ right to
rely is similarly situated in their common law status as employees,
not a term in the collective bargaining agreement.205 The opinion
further stated that the complaint is not alleging that the Club failed to
provide anything required by the agreement; the complaint does not
allege that the Club failed to provide a certified trainer or give preseason physicals.206 The complaint simply alleges that the Club
failed to provide a safe workplace or provide warnings of dangers the
players could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of, as
required by Missouri common law of torts.207 Green is therefore
consistent with preemption precedent.
Another area of confusion is the ambiguous use of the term “duty”
by courts. The concept of a defendant’s duty can arise in the first
prong of the preemption test as reciprocal of the plaintiff’s right.208
As noted above, that duty can be resolved by analyzing whether the
duty is found only in the collective bargaining agreement.209
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
See Green, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.
See id. at 1028–30; Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4–5.
Green, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1030.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1030. The court also noted that the assertions of the general terms of the
agreement were, at best, defenses by the Club that could not justify preemption. Id.
See id. at 1028.
Id. at 1026–28.
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987)
(exemplifying the issue of duty arising in first prong of preemption test).
See supra notes 134–50 and accompanying text.
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However, duty also can be raised as an issue in the second prong of
the preemption test when it is included as an element in a plaintiff’s
common law tort claim.210 A court may look to the collective
bargaining agreement as interpreting the common law element, as did
the courts in McCormick and Duerson.211 In this vein, the duty issue
is best resolved by only looking at the plaintiff’s complaint and
analyzing whether it alleges rights or duties outside of a specific term
in the collective agreement.212 If it does, the duty is not substantially
dependent on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement;
if it does not, the duty is dependent and the interpretation of an
essential element of the claim justifies preemption. The dissent in
McCormick confused this distinction by stating that preemption is
applicable when the duty is found only in a collective bargaining
agreement.213 The dissent had previously stated that the case was
concerned with the second prong of the test—whether the complaint
was substantially dependent upon a term of the collective bargaining
agreement.214 This portion of the analysis should have been utilized
only in the first prong of the test, not the second, interpretive
prong.215 Duerson is more confused by stating that it was only
employing the interpretive part of the test, but also stating at one
point, “[s]howing that a duty raised in a state-law tort claim
originates in a CBA is certainly sufficient to require preemption” and
citing Rawson.216 Duerson did not properly delineate the differences
between the two independent parts of the accepted preemption test,
but simply blended the two together.
The concept of duty has been confused even further because of a
quote by Justice White in Rawson: “This is not a situation where the
Union’s delegates are accused of acting in a way that might violate
the duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society.”217
Some courts have interpreted this language to mean that, for
preemption purposes, the defendant’s duty must be more than the
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See, e.g., McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 535–36 (4th Cir. 1991)
(exemplifying the issue of duty arising in the second prong of the preemption test).
Id. at 536; Duerson v. NFL, No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May
11, 2012).
Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 2004).
McCormick, 934 F.2d at 547–48 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
Id. at 540.
See supra notes 139–50 and accompanying text.
Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4 (citing United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S.
362, 369 (1990)).
Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371.
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common law tort duty and must be owed to everyone.218 Such a
reading is too broad. The better interpretation is that Justice White
intended to reference traditional common law tort duty: a general
duty owed to the public at large.219 Even if the narrower reading is
incorrect, the most important preemption inquiry is the source of the
defendant’s duty, not individuals to whom it is owed.220
The final major source of confusion is the ambivalent use of a
collective bargaining agreement’s grievance process by the Supreme
Court. Livadas specifically stated that one of the purposes of the
LMRA, which supports preemption, is not to allow employers or
employees “to renege on their arbitration promises by ‘relabeling’”
grievable issues as tort claims.221 On the other hand, Lingle
specifically stated that preemption is not appropriate even if the statelaw claim encompasses the same set of facts as a grievance process as
long as the compliant can be resolved without interpretation of the
agreement.222 Therefore, the Supreme Court has stated that the
existence of a possible grievance process is not relevant to
determining whether a claim is independent of the agreement, but
courts must be diligent to prohibit attempts to avoid the grievance
process.
The Lueck decision both created the confusion and provided the
basis for its ultimate resolution. The use of the disjunctive “or” at the
conclusion of the opinion implies that the preemption issue is a
separate analysis from the meaning of the substantive federal
common law which should ultimately resolve the case.223 Therefore,
the existence of a grievance provision ending in arbitration was not
relevant to the preemption result, but would be important in applying
§ 301 substantive law. The preemption issue should be resolved by
determining whether the state claim relied on a non-negotiable statelaw right or is “inextricably intertwined” with the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement.224 If the claim was substantially
dependent on a term or provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, then substantive § 301 common law dictated that the
plaintiff should not succeed because he failed to follow the grievance
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Brown v. NFL, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Sherwin v. Indianapolis
Colts, 752 F. Supp. 1172, 1177 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
Sagerian, supra note 3, at 239; Telis, supra note 130, at 1850.
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procedure in the collective bargaining agreement. The Court
confused the issue by stating early in the opinion that Lueck’s statelaw claim was preempted because of the national policy of
encouraging arbitration.225 Lucas Flour, cited by Lueck, correctly
placed arbitration in the substantive law of § 301.
Therefore, the proper resolution of this ambiguity should be that
the existence of a grievance process is irrelevant to the decision of
whether a claim is independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. That analysis should proceed as detailed in this Article.
If the claim is independent of the collective bargaining agreement,
then preemption is inappropriate and the existence of a possible (or
actual in Lingle) grievance should be ignored. However, if the claim
is found to be substantially dependent on a term in the collective
bargaining agreement, then the grievance process is the appropriate
forum for raising the claim.226
V. CONCLUSION
Much of the confusion in applying § 301 is related to a judicial
desire to expand the scope of its preemptive reach. The analysis
contained in this Article is premised on a narrower exclusion of state
common law tort claims. The language in the relevant Supreme
Court cases supports this perspective. In Lueck, the Court used the
phrase “inextricably intertwined” to describe the relationship between
a claim and a term of a collective bargaining agreement that justifies
preemption.227 In Williams, the Court used the phrase “substantially
dependent” to illustrate the fit between the complaint and collective
bargaining agreement needed to support preemption.228 The adverbs
contained in those formulations indicate that the relationship between
the claim and a term in the contract must be close in order to support
preemption. In Livadas, the Court described § 301 preemption as a
“sensible acorn” and not a “mighty oak.”229 The analogy is the
Supreme Court’s statement that a broad preemption of state common
law claims is inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated
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Id. at 219.
See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411 (1988); Givens v.
Tennessee Football, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 985, 991–92 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (quoting
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 219–20). For a discussion on the insufficiency of arbitration as a
remedy for state tort claims, see Sagerian, supra note 3, at 262–66.
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that § 301 preemption should be narrowly interpreted.230 The dissent
in McCormick acknowledges that its analysis:
[Section 301] dictates a comparably limited scope for the
preemptive force of that statute. It obviously preempts
state-law claims formally alleging violations of labor
contracts – the exact and only kind expressly made federal
ones by § 301. Beyond those, it only preempts, as a matter
of judicial interpretation, state-law claims that can be
determined to be claims for violation of labor contracts in
substance though not in form, and those only out of the felt
necessity that parties not be allowed “to evade the
requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as
claims for tortious breach of contract.”231
In fact, some scholars have argued that the limited scope of this
inquiry means that intentional torts should never be preempted.232
The narrow interpretation embraced by this Article is consistent
with Supreme Court opinions and significantly reduces the confusion
regarding the application of § 301 preemption. This approach also
restores the balance between the common law rights of unionized and
non-unionized workers.233 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
intended to restrict state common law tort claims unless there were
clear indications that the plaintiff was, in effect, filing a disguised
contract claim. The proposals contained herein reinvigorate the true
meaning of § 301 while still preserving the grievance process for
those contract claims that are properly within its jurisdiction.
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